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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I offer some observations on the liberalism of Ackerman and I 
interpret it as a mixed method of solution of the problems of rivalness of goods by 
means of a set of dialogical norms. 
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1. I would like to highlight some elements of B. Ackermann’s theory of 
social justice, as it is set out in his Social Justice in the Liberal State 
(henceforth SJLS) and, especially, in his theory of distributive justice. 
Ackerman’s theory is interesting since it promises to describe a possible 
justification of liberal state, starting from some, as it were, minimalistic 
assumptions.  
The first feature of a theory of social justice –as opposed to a theory of 
moral justice as in Nozick’s thought– is the reference to some structural 
principles. This reference to a set of structural principles is necessary in 
order of making interpersonal comparisons between at least two 
different agents at a given time or, in general,  between the different 
states raising from the distribution of social goods. For example, 
pursuing social equality means to make use of a structural principle. Of 
course, it is the same with act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism, the 
maximin criterion, Gauthier’s theory of strategic cooperation, and so on. 
To enforce a structural principle we must know two things: (a) which set 
of outcome, amongst the possible ones, has to be preferred; (b) which 
values must be held as a real pay-off for individuals. From this 
viewpoint, Ackermann, like Rawls, describes a structural theory of 
justice. The difference is that in Rawls’s case, when we are negotiating 
under the veil of ignorance, we are already in a social contract situation, 
where we already know that every future pay-off is contingent upon the 
fact that the social agents are agreed on the importance a certain 
number of goods, the so-called primary goods (incidentally, it is well-
PIERPAOLO MARRONE 
 
 381 
known that it is part of the primary goods the basis for self-respect, that 
is the self-knowledge of an agent as a moral person).  
 
 
2. From Ackermann’s perspective, social contract is a useless intellectual 
artifact. All we need is a set of conversational rules –rationality, 
convergence, neutrality. The application or, better to say, the 
lexicographical application of these rules makes sure that the outcomes 
of cooperation –what in Ackermann’s fiction is a fictional ubiquitous 
good, which represents goods in a situation of natural scarcity– are 
translated into the language of the monetary outcomes, health, 
education, and, surprisingly enough, into the acceptance of a general 
framework of liberties and political obligations, that we are get used to 
think as incorporated into liberal-democratic institutions. To know how 
to enforce distributive justice Rawls turns to maximin concept in the 
general conception of justice and to lexicographical order of the 
principles of justice in the special conception. Ackermann, from the 
beginning, turns to undominated equality. Undominated equality 
requires only that we are enjoying the condition to be a part of the 
dialogic exchange. So, equality as far as is the main condition of a 
dialogue aspiring to neutrality is a yardstick for a structural approach to 
justice. 
There is a second main feature that is shared both by Rawls and by 
Ackermann, maybe, more evident in Rawls’s construction than in 
Ackermann’s theory. While both Rawls and Ackermann try to rule out 
every intuitionistic result from their procedural approachs to justice,  
they have to persuade the reader that the uniqueness of the starting-
point –original position or undominated equality as a part of the 
dialogic exchange– is a guarantee that the same uniformity is somehow 
passing on to the ideal finishing line.  
Rawls is explicitly worried to avoid social conflict from his analysis of 
liberal institutions, and since social conflict mainly arises from disputes 
on distribution of resources, he tries to explain how to reach an outcome 
compatible with our social framework –a framework based upon the 
division of the classes–, but that is not destructive of the social order. 
For Ackermann, too, shaping an acceptable form of social conflict is one 
of the aim that social philosophy tries to pursue and justify. The 
principles of liberal dialogue seem to be the main instrument to state the 
priority of neutrality, that is of undominated equality. But this strategy 
is valid for us, now, from our historical, Western-based view-point. If in 
the next future we could discover another set of strategies, well, we 
would have come to a new phase of the liberal theory.  
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Would we have to take seriously such a prudent way to affirm the 
priority of liberal neutrality? I do not think so. My opinion is that the 
principles of dialogue are shown in a decreasing order of generality, but 
in a reverse order of importance.  
Rationality is a very general requirement, defined as follows. 
“whenever anybody questions the legitimacy of another power, the 
power holder must respond not by suppressing the questioner but by 
giving a reason that explains why he is more entitled to the resource 
than the questioner is” (SJLS, p. 4). Convergence is less general than 
rationality, because it requires to have a coherent set of believes through 
time and not contradictory believes. Neutrality is less general than 
convergence because it refers directly to one agent’s reasons, prescribing 
that “no reason is a good reason if it requires the powerholder to assert: 
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of 
his fellow citizens, or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, 
he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens” (SJLS, 
p. 11). 
What is interesting to know is if the principles of neutrality goes with 
or without a substantive content. In Ackermann’s theory I guess we can 
find two different strategy of defense of neutrality. The first one is a 
strict interpretation of neutrality. The second one is a more relaxed 
interpretation. I will try to show that the first interpretation is neither 
consistent with the uniformity required to a structural theory of justice 
nor with undominated equality. The strict interpretation simply state 
that since “I am at least as good as you are”, you cannot pretend to 
have a greater quantity of goods or if you can, you have to justify your 
pretension deriving it from the principles of liberal dialogue. What 
happens when I pretend to a greater quantity of public goods than 
yours? The assumption is that since our conceptions of good, of what is 
worth to pursue during a human life, are not ‘out there’, waiting for us 
to decide which one is the ‘true’ conception of good, we must stop to 
search a measure of their comparative value. But the fact that we can 
sometime trace a line of division amongst different and competing vision 
of goods, abstaining from a decision on which one is the ‘better’ one, 
does not mean that we are gotten clearer on how to distribute public 
goods. Maybe we would believe that, once accepted the plurality of 
different ways of living, we are giving concreteness to the liberal ideal of 
‘unforced agreement’. What it is sure is that this line of reasoning is on a 
pair with the liberal struggle against paternalism.  
Nevertheless, once we have agreed upon the impossibility to find a 
rationale to put in order –and it would be necessarely a lexicographical 
order– our competing Weltanschaaungen, we cannot say, at the same 
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time, that we have a rationale to put in order their different pretension 
over goods. If we are adopting a relaxed version of neutrality, we have 
to say that a peculiar set of distribution is to be preferred over another 
set, but that this is not a neutral outcome. If the story we are telling 
about liberalism is open-ended, we must prefer a neutral starting-point. 
But a neutral starting-point is unsuitable for preferring a peculiar 
distribution of the goods. So, there is no reason to exalt equality as a 
pure procedural effect of neutrality. Undominated equality is neither a 
direct nor a side-effect of neutrality for this reason: because equality is a 
value. If we are arguing on the basis that neutrality is a matter of 
procedure –and not a matter of value–, then we cannot derive a value 
from it. But, if we, from we beginning, have decided that neutrality is a 
value, then we can have two possible case: (1) it is an intrinsic value; (2) 
it is a instrumental value.  
(1) If it is an intrinsic value the problem is to show that equality is 
embedded in neutrality. But this is the same to say that the assertion 
‘neutrality is about equality’ is an analytical assertion. But, unless we 
are Platonic, we know that the attribution of meaning is a matter of 
agreement. So, the link between neutrality and equality is contingent.  
(2) If we think that neutrality is an instrumental value, a value 
needed to pursue or to reach another value, we have already decided 
that the other value is an intrinsic one. In doing so, we have built a 
lexicographical order and to have this kind of order in mind is not to 
have a neutral stance about social cooperation.  
If we are adopting a loser and more relaxed interpretation of 
neutrality we have to introduce at some point a shared notion of 
equality. But the result is the same as above. Every formal notion of 
equality is a matter of signing a contract about a social meaning. 
Besides, even when we have permitted the intrusion of a yardstick to 
define equality we cannot be sure that we are going to have one set of 
possible outcome. From the side of a theory of justice, we shall have an 
appropriate account of future payoffs as far as we could cut the semanti-
cal variety of meanings. Nevertheless, we have here two problems. First 
of all, the uniformity of outcomes is undermined via the possibility of 
refusing our yardstick. Why could we choose an equal portion of 
‘ackermanian-manna’ or equal resources rather than equal time sharing, 
equal utilities, equal opportunities or other rationale such as the 
happiness of the greatest number? In this last case, we can say that a 
kind of equality has been preserved, since the ambition of the utilitarian 
criterion is to treat people equally. Secondly, the problem of conflict is 
an internal feature of every distribution of goods, so we cannot hope to 
avoid it looking for an external measurement of equality.  
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Why is it an internal problem of distribution? Most public goods 
interactions are characterized by a certain degree of rivalness. It is 
usually said that a good is rival to the extent that the consumption of a 
unity of the good by one individual decreases the benefits for others who 
consume the same good. In the case of a perfect divisible good the 
consumption of a particular unit prevents any other individual from 
consuming it at all, so that there can be no question of benefiting from 
consumption. In this case we may say that the good is perfectly rival. 
Where there is some degree of divisibility, consumption reduces the 
amount available to other. This is the same as saying that where there is 
some degree of rivalness, consumption reduces the benefits to other 
consumer, bringing out the point that rivalness is strictly speaking a 
property of individuals, that is of their utility functions, not of the goods 
themselves. Broadly speaking, there are two sorts of solution of 
collective action problems, internal solution and external solutions. 
Internal solutions neither involve nor presuppose changes in the game, –
for example, specifying how much of the public good can be produced 
with a given contribution, or the preferences of the players or more 
generally their attitudes and their beliefs, including expectations. 
External solutions, on the other hand, work by changing the game, that 
is changing people’s possibilities, attitudes, and beliefs. The changes do 
not necessarily originate outside the group of individuals who have the 
collective action problem. Someone thinks that where an internal 
solution is forthcoming, there was no problem there to solve. For 
example, if the problem is correctly modeled as a dynamic game 
consisting of an iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, as a consequence the 
outcome produced by rational egoists –without any external assistance 
or other interference– would be mutual cooperation throughout the 
game, then it could be said that preferences –including inter-temporal 
preferences– are such that there is no collective action problem. All the 
external solutions presuppose the solution of other problems, always of 
collective action problems. Many of them, for example, involve the use 
of threats and sanctions and the creation and maintenance of the 
sanction system entail solutions of collective action problems.  
When we are thinking to a social agency which can enforce the 
patterned distribution of goods, we are operating through an external 
solution of the collective action problem, while a typical internal 
solution is an appeal to a shared sense of community. Ackermann’s 
strategy is a mix of external and internal solution. The most part of his 
theory seems to be external, because of his appeal to a set of rules which 
can solve the conflict between different systems of norms. The social 
game is typically conceived as a bargaining-game. But, clearly, 
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Ackermann’s bargaining is not merely a matter of bargaining strength, 
with no place for norms. Sometimes, it could happens that one actor 
believes so strongly in norms of fair distribution that the other actors 
are constrained, sometimes by short-sighted interpretation of their self-
interests, to accept outcomes dictated by norms, but this is not the 
normal case in a liberal society, while it can be normal in totalitarian 
society. Liberal society is a place for regulating conflicting norms. We 
often forget this and insist on the aspect of social order or in the rethoric 
of the armony produced by an invisible hand. In Ackermann’s view 
there is a kind of armony, the armony of dialogue which is external only 
in our reconstructution. As a matter of fact, it is an internally-morally-
based constraint to determine that the different social distributions are 
fair because of their being adequate to the outcome of rational dialogue, 
while they are  a contingent point of equilibrium in a regulated struggle 
within a shared value: preserving and extending freedom. 
 
